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Abstract— Intelligent systems and advanced automation are 
involved in information collection and evaluation, in decision-
making and in the implementation of chosen actions. In such 
systems, human responsibility becomes equivocal. Understanding 
human responsibility is particularly important when intelligent 
autonomous systems can harm people, as with autonomous vehicles 
or, most notably, with Advanced Weapon Systems (AWS). Using 
Information Theory, we develop a responsibility quantification 
(ResQu) model of human involvement in intelligent automated 
systems and demonstrate its applications on decisions regarding 
AWS. The analysis reveals that human comparative responsibility 
is often low, even when major functions are allocated to the human. 
Thus, broadly stated policies of keeping humans in the loop and 
having meaningful human control are misleading and cannot truly 
direct decisions on how to involve humans in intelligent systems and 
advanced automation. Our responsibility model can guide system 
design decisions and can aid policy and legal decisions regarding 
human responsibility in intelligent systems. 
 
 
Note to Practitioners — The development of advanced 
automated systems gives rise to questions on meaningful human 
involvement in the functioning of such systems. Specifically, it is 
difficult to assess the “true” human responsibility for system 
processes. We developed a model and a quantitative measure for 
computing the comparative human responsibility level in the 
interaction with intelligent systems and advanced automation. 
Our responsibility measure can be applied by practitioners 
(system designers, system operators, regulators, etc.) to calculate 
user responsibility in specific system configurations. It can serve 
as input for the comparison between alternative system designs or 
deployment policies by relating different automation design 
options to their predicted effect on the users’ comparative 
responsibility. 
 
 
Index Terms— Analytical models, Artificial intelligence, 
autonomous systems, decision making, human–computer 
interaction (HCI), information theory, Intelligent systems, 
responsibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
dvanced automation and intelligent systems have 
become ubiquitous and are major parts of our life. 
Financial markets largely function through algorithmic trading 
mechanisms [1, 2], semiconductor manufacturing is almost 
entirely automated [3], and decision support systems and aids 
for diagnostic interpretation have become part of medical 
practice [4, 5]. Similarly, in aviation, flight management 
systems control almost all parts of the flight [6, 7], and in 
surface transportation, public transportation is increasingly 
automated, and the first autonomous cars appear on public 
roads [8, 9]. In these systems, computers and human share the 
execution of different functions, such as the collection and 
evaluation of information, decision-making and action 
implementation.  
As these intelligent systems become more advanced, the 
human comparative responsibility becomes equivocal. For 
instance, what is a human’s responsibility when all information 
about an event arrives through a system that collects and 
analyzes data from multiple sources, without the human having 
access to any independent sources of information? If the human 
receives an indication that a certain action is needed, and 
accordingly performs the action, should the human be held 
responsible for the outcome of the action if it causes harm? 
Human responsibility is particularly important when system 
actions can possibly injure people, as may be the case with 
autonomous vehicles. It becomes crucial when such harm is 
certain, as with autonomous weapon systems (AWS), 
deliberately designed to inflict lethal force. 
So far, the subject of human responsibility was investigated 
from philosophical, ethical, moral and legal perspectives, but it 
has received less attention in the literature on cognitive 
engineering of human-automation interaction. This prompts for 
the development of a quantitative model of human 
responsibility. To answer this need, we set out to develop the 
analytical Responsibility Quantification (ResQu) model, that 
enables us to compute human responsibility in the interaction 
with intelligent systems and automation. We will demonstrate 
its application on the example of advanced weapon systems 
(AWS), because this issue raises particular public concerns. 
However, the model is applicable wherever intelligent systems 
and automation play a major role.  
A. Human Involvement and Responsibility 
Philosophical research has dealt extensively with the concept 
of responsibility, investigating its different facets, namely role 
responsibility, causal responsibility, liability (or legal 
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responsibility) and moral responsibility [10-12]. When 
discussing human interaction with intelligent systems and 
automation, role responsibility relates to the process of function 
allocation, which assigns specific roles and duties to the 
operator and to the automation. However, this role assignment 
does not specify the causal relations between the operator's 
actions and different consequences and outcomes. This relation 
is better defined by causal responsibility, which describes the 
actual human contribution to system outcomes.  
So far, causal responsibility was usually associated with 
people - a person or an organization was seen as more or less 
responsible for a particular event. When an event involved 
technology, the responsibility was usually with the user, unless 
some unforeseeable circumstances caused some unexpected 
outcome. Manufacturers of systems could also be held 
responsible if, for instance, they failed to install proper 
safeguards. 
The field changed with the introduction of automation, 
defined as the system performing parts or all of a task that was 
or could have been performed by humans [14]. The ability to 
control a system and the resulting consequences is a necessary 
condition for assigning responsibility [15]. However, humans 
may no longer be able to control intelligent systems and 
advanced automation sufficiently to be rightly considered 
responsible. As the level of automation and system intelligence 
increase, there is a shift towards shared control, in which the 
human and computerized systems jointly make decisions or 
control actions. These are combined to generate a final control 
action or decision. There may also be supervisory control, in 
which the human sets high-level goals, monitors the system and 
only intervenes if necessary [16]. In coactive designs, humans 
and systems engage in joint activities, based on supporting 
interdependence and complementary relations in performing 
sensing, planning, and acting functions ]81 ,71[ . Moreover, in 
advanced systems, which incorporate artificial intelligence, 
neural networks, and machine-learning, developers and users 
may be unable to fully control or predict all possible behaviors 
and outcomes, since their internal structure can be opaque (a 
“black box”) and sometimes can yield odd and counterintuitive 
results ]20, 19[ . 
Consequently, humans’ responsibility in intelligent or highly 
automated systems becomes equivocal and cannot be separated 
from the causal contribution of the system’s configuration and 
reliability. The automated system itself (or its developers) may 
be perceived as sharing some of the responsibility [21, 22]. This 
understanding resembles the legal concept of comparative 
responsibility, a doctrine of tort law that divides fault among 
different parties [23-25].  
This notion is related to the possible discrepancy between 
authority and responsibility that may arise in intelligent systems 
when a human is assigned certain roles without being 
sufficiently able to control the automatic processes ]13[ . In such 
cases, the human may be considered fully legally responsible 
for adverse outcomes, even when contributing very little to 
create these outcomes, or when not having sufficient control to 
prevent them. A measure of partial causal human responsibility 
can provide a better description of the human’s contribution to 
creating the adverse outcomes.  
To conclude, the rapid developments in technology create an 
inevitable responsibility gap in the ability to divide causal 
responsibility between human and advanced automated or 
intelligent systems. This gap cannot be bridged using traditional 
concepts of responsibility [26-28].  
B. Human involvement in Advanced Weapon Systems (AWS) 
The rapid developments in AWS have raised concerns that 
with increasingly intelligent and autonomous military 
technologies, humans will become less and less involved in 
their use and less responsible for lethal outcomes [27, 29-31]. 
These systems also raise critically important issues of 
controllability and safety, since in the event of a failure they 
could lead to catastrophes such as mass fratricide or civilian 
casualties, with limited (or no) human ability to intervene and 
prevent the adverse consequences ]20[ . 
These concerns prompted extensive philosophical, ethical, 
and legal debates, which elicited calls to restrict and regulate 
the development of advanced AWS or even ban their use 
altogether [15, 32-39]. Governments respond to these worries 
with the assurance and demands that a human will be kept in 
the loop, whenever advanced automated systems exert lethal 
force [29]. The explicit policy of the U.S. Department of 
Defense is that "Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators 
to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use 
of force" [40]. In addition, under U.S. policy, supervised 
autonomous weapon systems may select and engage targets 
only in local defensive operations, such as protecting land-bases 
and ships, and fully autonomous weapon systems are limited to 
application of non-lethal, non-kinetic force [40]. The UK policy 
is that the operation of weapon systems will always be under 
human control, and that no offensive systems are to have the 
capability to prosecute targets without involving a human [41]. 
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and 
other organizations promote the need for meaningful human 
control of AWS [42]. This approach aims to ensure that 
commanders and operators will have enough information to 
make conscious decisions, and can intervene if necessary, and 
that AWS should be designed to facilitate such meaningful 
control [43]. 
C. Meaningful human involvement  
The demand to involve humans in automated processes and 
facilitating meaningful human control is not unique to AWS 
[44]. However, simply putting a human into the loop does not 
assure that the human will have a meaningful role in the 
process. There may be cases when the human cannot 
knowledgably supervise the system, or when the human has to 
make decisions, based exclusively on input from automated 
functions that one cannot evaluate independently [45]. 
System designers often keep humans in the loop to cope with 
unexpected events, even when the human may be unable to 
cope with such events. In this case, humans may function as 
“moral crumple zones”, being the ones to carry moral and legal 
responsibility when the system fails [46, 47]. 
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Currently, there are different, and sometimes contradicting 
interpretations and policies regarding meaningful human 
involvement. System designers lack models and metrics needed 
for systematically addressing the issue of meaningful human 
control [48]. Our responsibility quantification (ResQu) model 
aims to address these needs, based on the premise that 
meaningful human involvement requires the human to have 
some causal responsibility for the outcomes. 
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY QUANTIFICATION MODEL (RESQU) 
A. A general model of information flow in a human-
automation system 
According to Parasuraman et al. [14], a combined human-
automation system performs a sequence of four consecutive 
information processing functions: the acquisition of 
information, the analysis of that information, the decision what 
action to take, based on the information, and the 
implementation of the action. Each of the four functions can be 
automated at some level, from the lowest level of fully manual 
performance to the highest level of fully automatic 
performance.  
A model developed by Conant [49] uses n-dimensional 
Information Theory to analyze the information flow in real-
world systems, composed of interacting parts and subsystems. 
The system acquires input from its environment, and it 
generates output to the environment. Each variable in the 
system is a message source, which sends information about its 
values to other variables. Thereby, the functioning of the 
system, which is usually formulated as a process of causes, 
effects, and activities, becomes a network of transmitters, 
channels, and receivers. With this representation, one can 
quantify the information flow, causal relations, and statistical 
dependence between variables and subsystems in terms of 
Entropy and Mutual Information (also called Transmission).  
We integrated Parasuraman et al.’s and Conant’s models and 
created a general model of information flow in a combined 
human-automation system. Similar to principles of coactive 
design ]81, 71[ , the integrated model includes both the human 
and the machine as equal components of the integrated system 
and supports interdependent human-machine relations in 
performing sensing, planning, and acting functions. However, 
differently from coactive design, our model uses information 
theory to analyze the interactions and interdependencies within 
the human-machine system and with the environment.   
 The integrated information flow model will serve us to 
quantify human responsibility as a function of the system 
design, selected automation levels, and function allocation. 
B. Notation 
The System: Assume a system that consists of two 
subsystems: an automated module and a human user. Although 
the terms “system” and “automation” usually carry similar 
connotations, in the present study the term system refers to the 
overall system, containing both the human and the automated 
module subsystems, and it indicates their combined 
performance. The terms “human” and "automated module" 
refer to the subsystems and to their specific performance and 
parameters. 
Environment states: The system operates in an environment 
that can be in one of N possible states (N≥2). Each of the N 
states can be characterized by m different observable and 
measurable parameters Ei (i=1...m). Different states have 
different, but partially overlapping, distributions on each of the 
values of Ei (i=1...m). Thus, when observing specific 
realization of Ei (i=1...m), the current environment state 
remains uncertain.  
Information acquisition: The first stage deals with the 
acquisition and registration of multiple sources of information. 
Let Yi, and Xi (i=1...m) denote, respectively, the acquired values 
of Ei (i=1...m) by the automated module and the human. Due to 
measurement and accuracy limitations of the sensors, the 
measurements Yi and Xi (i=1...m) may add uncertainty (or 
internal noise) to the actual observed value Ei, (i=1...m). In 
addition, not all the m state-characteristic variables are 
observable by the human or the automated module. When a 
certain state characteristic variable Ei is not observable by the 
human, Xi will not contain any information about Ei (and the 
same for Yi, when Ei is not observable by the automated 
module).  
Information analysis phase: The second stage deals with 
manipulation of the acquired information to infer the current 
environment state, as a base for action selection. Let Ya and Xa, 
denote, respectively, N dimension vectors, generated by the 
automated module and human subsystems, that assign posterior 
probabilities to each of the possible N environment states, based 
on the acquired information by each subsystem Yi, and Xi 
(i=1...m). Depending on the system’s automation level and 
function allocation, the results of one subsystem's information 
analysis or action selection may serve as an additional source 
of information for the other subsystem's information analysis.  
Action selection phase: In the third stage, decisions are made 
and actions are selected, based on the results of the information 
analysis. Let Ys and Xs denote, respectively, variables of the 
automated module and the human that correspond to the 
selection of a preferred action amongst a set of finite action 
alternatives. For the automated module, Ys is uniquely defined 
by the automated module’s algorithm, once all input variables 
Yi, (i=1...m) are acquired, and the analysis algorithm Ya is 
executed. For the human, Xs is based on the results of the human 
information analysis Xa, and it depends on characteristics of the 
human utility function, which relates costs and benefits to 
different outcomes that may be generated by each action 
alternative.   
Action implementation phase: The fourth and final stage 
involves the implementation of the selected action. Let Z denote 
the implemented action. We assume that the implemented 
action Z only depends on the actions selected by the automation 
and the human, Ys and Xs , and on the relative amount of human 
versus automatic impact on generating a response. Dictated by 
the system configuration and the automation level, Z may be 
entirely determined by the human action selection, by the 
automated module, or by a combination of the two. In systems 
that incorporate adaptive automation (dynamic function 
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allocation), the determination of Z may vary according to the 
identified environment state. This may be the case, for example, 
in systems where automation can override human actions when 
it identifies a critical emergency that is beyond human response 
capabilities, such as automatic emergency breaking systems in 
cars. Fig. 1 presents a schematic depiction of system variables 
and information flow in the integrated model.  
 
Fig. 1.  General model of information flow in an automated human-machine 
system. Dashed lines represent possible information transfer between the 
human user and the automation module  
The general information flow model presented above 
portrays possible system variables and information flows in a 
human-automation system. However, in actual systems some of 
the variables and information flow routes do not exist. For 
example, many decision support systems (DSS) perform only 
the analysis function, and they present the results of the analysis 
to the human for decision making and action selection. In such 
systems, the internal information flow is only from the 
automated module subsystem to the human subsystem, and the 
output of the system Z depends only on the human action 
selection. Fig. 2 presents such a case. The ResQu model can be 
similarly applied to analyze the information flow in other types 
of systems, having various levels of automation and types of 
human control, such as shared control or supervisory control. 
 
Fig. 2.  Information flow and system variables in a typical Decision Support 
Alert System (DSS) 
C. Defining Responsibility measures 
We measure human responsibility by quantifying the unique 
comparative share of the human in determining the distribution 
of the system output Z (the implemented action). We do so by 
computing the proportion of the output distribution that cannot 
be a result from automation, and thus represents the unique 
share of human contribution in determining the system’s output. 
Using Information Theory [50, 51] we define the comparative 
human responsibility for the system output Z as 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) ≝  ு(௓/௒భ…௒೘ ,௒ೌ ,௒ೞ)
ு(௓)
                           (1) 
 
where H(X) is Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of 
uncertainty related to a discrete random variable X, defined as: 
 
𝐻(𝑋) ≝ − ∑ 𝑝(𝑥)𝑙𝑜𝑔ଶ𝑝(𝑥)௫∈ఞ                      (2) 
 
and H(X/Y) is the conditional entropy, which is a measure of the 
uncertainty remaining about a variable X when a variable Y is 
known: 
 
𝐻(𝑋/𝑌) ≝ − ∑ 𝑝(𝑦) ∑ 𝑝(𝑥/𝑦)௫∈ఞ 𝑙𝑜𝑔ଶ𝑝(𝑥/𝑦)௬∈ఊ          (3) 
 
The conditional entropy in the numerator of Resp(Z), 
𝐻(𝑍/𝑌ଵ … 𝑌௠ , 𝑌௔ , 𝑌௦) computes the uncertainty remaining about 
Z (the overall system output), when the results of the 
automation information acquisition, information analysis and 
action selection are known. In our model, this remaining 
uncertainty may be attributed only to human subsystem 
variables. Thus, the ratio of the conditional entropy and the full 
entropy of Z quantifies the unique comparative human 
contribution in determining the distribution of the system 
output Z.  
The use of Shannon's entropy averages the comparative 
human contribution over all possible states in the environment, 
their distribution on the set of measurable parameters, and the 
resultant distributions of human and automation parameters. 
By definition, Resp(Z) ∈ [0,1] . Resp(Z)=1 iff  
𝐻(𝑍/𝑌ଵ … 𝑌௠ , 𝑌௔ , 𝑌௦) = 𝐻(𝑍). This occurs if, and only if, the 
system output variable Z is independent from the automation 
variables. In that case, all uncertainty about Z is completely 
resolved by the human, and thus the human is fully responsible 
for the system output. Resp(Z)=0 iff  
𝐻(𝑍/𝑌ଵ … 𝑌௠ , 𝑌௔ , 𝑌௦) = 0. This happens if, and only if 
𝑌ଵ … 𝑌௠ , 𝑌௔ , 𝑌௦ completely determine Z without any unique 
contribution of the human. Values between 0 and 1 represent 
intermediate levels of unique human contribution to the overall 
output (i.e. level of meaningful human involvement), given the 
automation performance.   
Our responsibility measure is related to Theil's uncertainty 
coefficient, U(X/Y), which is a measure of the association 
between two variables X and Y [52, 53]. Theil's uncertainty 
coefficient computes the relative reduction in the uncertainty of 
a variable X due to the knowledge of another variable Y: 
 
𝑈(𝑋/𝑌) ≝  ூ(௑:௒)
ு(௑)
= ு(௑)ିு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
                        (4) 
 
where I(X:Y) is the mutual information between X and Y. Theil's 
uncertainty coefficient is more general than the notion of 
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statistical correlation, since it can be used to measure complex, 
not necessarily linear associations, as well as associations 
between nominal variables. It has values between zero and one. 
It equals 0 iff the variables are statistically independent and 
share no mutual information, and it equals 1 iff knowledge 
about the value of Y fully enables one to predict the value of X.   
Our approach differs from Theil’s coefficient in that we are 
not just measuring the association between two variables, but 
rather our ResQu responsibility value measures complex 
associations in a compound human-automation system, 
characterized by multiple variables and inter-dependencies. 
Also, Theil’s coefficient focuses on the relative reduction in the 
uncertainty of a variable, given knowledge about another 
variable, while our ResQu score computes the relative 
remaining uncertainty, given knowledge about other variables. 
To calculate the responsibility measure (which is based on 
entropy and mutual information), one must either deduce the 
underlying distributions from known system properties or from 
empirical observations. In either case, the combined human-
automation system must be assumed stationary and ergodic. A 
caveat to the model is that many real-world systems may not be 
stationary and ergodic or cannot be observed sufficiently to 
allow accurate estimates of multivariate probabilities. 
Nevertheless, for these systems, the construction of the ResQu 
information flow model, and the analysis of the human 
responsibility measure, often have sensible nonmathematical 
interpretations [49]. For example, although humans do not truly 
fit the exact formal definition of "channels", studies did 
measure human channel capacity and it was found to be useful. 
III. AN APPLICATION OF THE RESQU MODEL  
A. General 
The ResQu model, presented in the previous section, is an 
abstract model of information flow in a combined human-
automation system, in which details of how the human and the 
automation communicate, decide on actions, and resolve 
discrepancies are abstracted through different variables 
characterizing the environment, and the human and the 
automation activities during the execution of four information 
processing functions. The model quantifies the comparative 
human responsibility by analyzing interdependencies between 
the various system’s variables and by extracting the relative 
contribution of the human to the distribution of the combined 
system output.  
The ResQu model can be applied to quantify the human 
responsibility in a wide range of real-world interactions 
between human and intelligent systems when performing joint 
human-machine tasks. In this section we present an application 
of the ResQu model to a wide family of decision support 
systems (DSS) which automatically classify or categorize some 
input into some attribute and may also recommend on a 
required response. Such are, for example, systems that give 
audible, visual or other form of indication about a hazard, 
exceeding of normal operational parameters, or identification 
of another pre-specified condition that demand human attention 
or involvement. These systems are widely used in flight decks, 
industrial control rooms, autonomous vehicles, medical 
equipment, and more [7, 54-56]. 
B. Information flow model for AWS 
Within the above family of DSS, we chose to focus on AWS, 
which automatically detect and classify entities in the 
battlefield and alert their operators when classifying events as 
possible hostile targets. This is an important and controversial 
subject, as the development of AWS causes major concerns 
regarding human responsibility. 
We construct a simple representative scheme of the 
information flow in an AWS, which detects and classifies 
targets automatically but requires some level of human 
involvement during the engagement process, either in the loop 
or on the loop. This is the typical structure of an AWS that 
complies with current U.S. and UK policies. A caveat is that we 
model the human control in a simplified manner which, 
although it enables important insights, does not capture all 
nuances of function allocation and human control of automated 
systems, and specifically AWS ]57 ,56 ,84 ,54 ,20 ,81[  
To calculate the human responsibility, based on information 
theory measures, one must make assumptions regarding the 
probabilistic distributions and the interdependencies of the 
different variables that characterize the environment, the 
human, and the AWS. One way to do so is to use the 
assumptions and formulation of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) 
[59-61]. This is a well-established approach to measure the 
ability to differentiate between information-bearing signals (or 
stimuli) and random noise and to decide on a proper response. 
SDT has applications in many fields, such as psychology, 
decision-making, telecommunications, medical diagnostics, 
biology, alarm management, machine learning (statistical 
classification), and military (e.g. in radar research).  
We used an equal variance Gaussian SDT model to represent 
the probabilistic nature of the representative AWS, the 
environment in which it operates, the human activities and 
interactions with the automation and the incentives which 
influence response selection, in a manner described below (see 
the Appendix for a detailed description). 
Assume that an AWS operates in an environment with only 
two types of entities: targets, which should be engaged, and 
noise, which are entities that resemble targets, but which should 
not be engaged. Engagement of noise entities leads to undesired 
costs, such as collateral damage, fratricide or the waste of 
expensive or limited ammunition on false targets. The relative 
frequency of targets in the environment is Pt, and the relative 
frequency of noise is 1-Pt.  
The overall operational goal of the AWS is to detect, identify 
and engage targets, while avoiding the engagement of noise. To 
do so, the system automatically scans specific designated areas 
(e.g., specific geographic regions or air sectors) for the presence 
of entities. We assume that the system detects all entities in its 
vicinity with certainty. Hence, the main challenge for the AWS 
is the classification of each detected entity as target or noise. 
The classification of entities relies on the combined 
performance of two subsystems - a human operator and an 
automated module.  
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Target and noise entities have physical characteristics that 
are to some extent discernible to human senses or other sensors 
(e.g., optical, thermal electromagnetic and acoustic signature, 
mobility characteristics, etc.). Denote by e, the set of the 
observable physical characteristic of the state of the world. We 
assume that the human operator and the automatic module each 
observes a different uncorrelated measurable property of the 
state of the world, based on e. The distributions of these 
properties for target and noise are Gaussian with equal variance 
but different means, allowing some discrimination between the 
two types of entities. However, the distributions overlap, so 
there is uncertainty whether an observed entity is a target or 
noise. In terms of the SDT formulation, we assume that the 
human operator and the automated module each have detection 
sensitivities (d’Human and d’Automation), defining their respective 
capabilities to distinguish between target and noise entities. The 
detection sensitivity measures express the respective 
classification capabilities, as commonly used in a wide range of 
contexts and real-life applications of SDT. 
The human and the automation may also differ in their 
response criteria (βHuman and βAutomation), defining their bias 
toward classifying an entity as a target or noise. Each response 
criterion specifies a threshold value. The detector classifies 
events as targets when they are above the threshold and as noise 
otherwise. In actual systems, this threshold is a value the 
algorithm uses for the automation, and it reflects the human’s 
bias in decision making, depending on the likelihood of targets 
and the costs and benefits of different outcomes.  
According to SDT, the optimal response criterion maximizes 
the expected value of a payoffs scheme in which VTP, VFP, VTN, 
and VFN represent, respectively the values associated with 
correct target classification (True Positive), incorrect target 
classification (False Positive) when noise is falsely classified as 
a target, correct classification of noise as noise (True 
Negatives), and false classification of a target as noise (False 
Negatives). The payoff scheme, which represents the values of 
the outcomes in actual systems, will usually not be in monetary 
terms. Rather, it expresses some assessment of the relative 
utility of outcomes in terms of costs and benefits (for instance, 
associating a very high cost, VFP, to cases in which a civilian 
entity is falsely classified as a legitimate target for 
engagement). These payoffs can reflect the values human 
operators or system designers associate with outcomes, but they 
can also reflect the values an organization, in which the system 
is deployed, associates with outcomes. It is important to note 
that due to possible differences in the preferences, the values 
system designers associate with different outcomes may or may 
not be identical to the values of the human operator. Such 
differences can lead to differences in the action selection 
preferences between the human operator and the automation.  
The automated module conducts an independent binary 
classification process, based on its detection sensitivity and its 
preset response criteria, with Y denoting its classification result 
(target or noise). This result may include correct or incorrect 
classifications of targets and noise. 
We assume that the engagement process itself is mostly 
automatic, but it requires some level of human involvement, 
whether in the loop or on the loop. In human in the loop control, 
we assume that whenever the automation classifies an entity as 
a target, the engagement process proceeds only if the human 
decides to engage and actively authorizes the engagement. The 
engagement halts if the human decides to abort and remains 
passive (does not authorize the engagement). In human on the 
loop control, we assume that whenever the automation 
classifies an entity as a target, the engagement proceeds 
automatically, as long as the human remains passive, and halts 
only if the human takes an active action to abort it. In addition, 
in both types of control, the human can always decide to engage 
an entity, even if the automation classified it as noise. Thus, in 
both cases the human has to decide whether to engage or to 
abort. To do so, the human combines the information from the 
automated module with additional information the human has 
and responds accordingly. The only actual difference is whether 
an active response is required to implement the chosen action, 
or whether the human can remain passive.  
The human action selection is denoted by X, and can be either 
to engage or to abort. According to SDT, when aided by such 
an automated module, a rational, payoff-maximizing human 
should use two different response criteria: one is used when the 
automated module classifies an entity as target and the other 
when the automated module classifies an entity as noise. The 
differential adjustment of the response criteria depends on the 
human’s assessment of the automated module capabilities. 
When using a reliable AWS with high capabilities, the human 
should adopt a lower cutoff point when the system classifies an 
entity as a target, which would increase the tendency to engage, 
and a higher cutoff point when the system classifies an entity as 
noise, which would increase the tendency to abort. 
If the human chooses to engage an entity, the system 
conducts the rest of the engagement process (e.g., missile lock 
on target and missile firing) without the need for human 
intervention. The outcome of the integrated system is denoted 
by Z. This outcome represents whether a detected entity was 
eventually engaged or not. It is important to note that in both 
types of human control, humans have the final word and can 
always override and alter the automated module's 
recommendation, based on their own information analysis and 
action selection processes. Thus, in the portrayed system, Z is 
strictly determined by the results of the human action selection 
process. Fig. 3 depicts the above description of system structure 
and information flow in a typical AWS that includes human 
involvement, either in the loop or on the loop 
 
Fig. 3.  Information flow model and parameters of a typical AWS system 
that include human involvement 
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C. Defining responsibility measures for AWS  
The information flow and system structure, shown in Fig.3, 
enable us to simplify the general formula for Resp(Z), to: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) ≝  ு(௓/௒)
ு(௓)
                                 (5) 
 
Now, the system output Z only depends on the human action 
selection X (see Fig. 3), so we have: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) ≝  ு(௓/௒)
ு(௓)
 = ு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
 ≝ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 (𝑋)              (6) 
 
Although the human action selection fully determines the 
system's output, this selection depends to some extent on the 
information from the automated module, as would be the case 
in most decision support systems. Since, Resp(Z)= Resp(X), it 
is sufficient to compute the human responsibility for action 
selection X. To do so, we need to compute the entropy H(Y) of 
the automated module classification variable, the entropy H(X) 
of the human action selection variable, and their joint entropy 
H(X,Y). 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑋) = ு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
 = ு(௑,௒)ିு(௒)
ு(௑)
                        (7) 
 
To compute the distribution of Y and X and their entropy, we 
use the simplifying assumptions of a basic equal variance 
Gaussian SDT model: (a) The distributions of the observed 
values of target and noise are normal with unit variance and 
means that are d’ units apart, with the target having the higher 
mean. This assumption is relevant to many real-life detection 
applications, such as radar detection mechanism. (b) The 
system designers and human operators associate the same cost 
and benefits values (VFP VTN VFN VTP) to the possible outcomes. 
This assumption means that the system designers and the 
operators of the system share similar incentives and action 
selection preferences (e.g. they associate a similar high cost, 
VFP, to false engagements of non-targets). (c) The values the 
human operator associate with different outcomes are 
independent of the classification results of the automatic 
module. (d) The information acquisitions of the human and the 
module, given a certain state of the world, are uncorrelated. 
Such assumption may hold for example when the human and 
the automated module base their information acquisition on 
different uncorrelated properties of the state of the world (e.g. 
optical vs. electromagnetic signatures). (e) The human is 
rational and has full knowledge about the general 
characteristics of the automation (its detection sensitivity and 
cutoff) that determine the automation capabilities. It is 
important to note that this assumption does not mean that the 
human can supervise the automated module and can determine 
whether its classifications are correct.   
We first compute the distribution of Y and its entropy. 
Substituting d'Automation and βAutomation into the general SDT 
formulas in the appendix, we can compute the automated 
module's expected rates of True Positive (TP), False Negative 
(FN), False Positive(FP) and True Negative (TN) which will be 
denoted by 𝑃෨்௉, 𝑃෨ிே, 𝑃෨ி௉, and 𝑃෨்ே, respectively. Using these 
rates and the target probability Pt, we can compute the 
distribution of Y, which is presented in Table I, from which the 
computation of the entropy of Y is straightforward. 
 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF Y  
(CLASSIFICATION RESULTS OF THE AUTOMATED MODULE) 
Y 
"Target" 𝑃௧𝑃෨்௉ + (1 − 𝑃௧)𝑃෨ி௉ 
"Noise" 𝑃௧𝑃෨ிே + (1 − 𝑃௧)𝑃෨்ே 
 
We proceed to compute the joint distribution of X and Y, the 
human and automation variables. When aided by the automated 
module, the human uses two different response criteria 
according to the module's classification results (target or noise). 
Assuming the use of optimal response criteria, it is possible to 
compute the expected True Positive and False Positive rates of 
the human, using common SDT formulas (see details in the 
appendix). We will denote the human expected rates, when the 
module indicates that an entity is noise, by 𝑃்௉/"ே", 𝑃ிே/"ே", 
𝑃்ே/"ே", and 𝑃ி௉/"ே". When the module indicates that an entity 
is a target, we will denote the human expected rates 
by 𝑃்௉/"்",𝑃ிே/"்", 𝑃்ே/"்", and 𝑃ி௉/"்". The joint distribution of 
X and Y is presented in Table II, from which the computation of 
the joint entropy H(X,Y) is straightforward. 
 
TABLE II 
Joint distribution of X (human action selection) 
 and Y (classification results of the automated module) 
 
  X (Action selection by the Human) 
  Abort Engage 
Y 
(Module 
classification) 
"Target" 
𝑃௧𝑃෨்௉𝑃ிே/"்"
+ (1 − 𝑃௧)𝑃෨ி௉𝑃்ே/"்" 
𝑃௧𝑃෨்௉𝑃்௉/"்"
+ (1 − 𝑃௧)𝑃෨ி௉𝑃ி௉/"்" 
"Noise" 
𝑃௧𝑃෨ிே𝑃ிே/"ே"
+ (1 − 𝑃௧)𝑃෨்ே𝑃்ே/"ே" 
𝑃௧𝑃෨ிே𝑃்௉/"ே"
+ (1 − 𝑃௧)𝑃෨்ே𝑃ி௉/"ே" 
 
 
The marginal distribution of Y in Table II is the same as in 
Table I, because 𝑃்௉/"்" + 𝑃ிே/"்" = 1 and 𝑃்ே/"்" + 𝑃ி௉/"்" =
1. From Table 2 we can also derive the marginal distribution of 
X (the human action selection variable), which is summarized 
in Table III, from which the computation of the entropy of X is 
straightforward. 
 
 
TABLE III 
Distribution of X (human action selection) 
X 
(Human) 
Abort 
𝑃௧(𝑃෨்௉𝑃ிே/"்" + 𝑃෨ிே𝑃ிே/"ே")
+ (1 − 𝑃௧)(𝑃෨ி௉𝑃்ே/"்"
+ 𝑃෨்ே𝑃்ே/"ே") 
Engage 
𝑃௧(𝑃෨்௉𝑃்௉/"்" + 𝑃෨ிே𝑃்௉/"ே")
+ (1 − 𝑃௧)(𝑃෨ி௉𝑃ி௉/"்"
+ 𝑃෨்ே𝑃ி௉/"ே") 
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D. Quantitative Results 
Four variables influence the human action selection process 
and the resulting human responsibility. These include one 
environment-related variable (the relative frequency of targets 
in the environment, Pt), the human’s and the automation’s 
detection sensitivities (d'Human and d'Automation) and the ratio of 
payoffs both the human and the automated module associate 
with correct and incorrect actions (𝑉௥௔௧௜௢ =
௏೅ಿି௏ಷು
௏೅ುି௏ಷಿ 
). In this 
setting, the human and the automation use the same response 
criterion (which is derived from 𝑉௥௔௧௜௢ and Pt). 
Each set of values for these four variables specifies a 
different combination of environment, automation and human 
characteristics and relative outcome preferences. This leads to 
different human and automation rates of True Positives and 
False Negatives, from which one can compute the distributions 
on which the human’s responsibility calculation in based (see 
Tables I, II, and III).  
 
Proposition 1: The comparative human responsibility, 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍), is monotonically decreasing in d'Automation, and 
monotonically increasing in d'Human. 
Proof: Proof is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 has an intuitive explanation. Under the above 
assumptions, a human with a given detection sensitivity will 
rely less on information from less capable automation (in terms 
of the automation detection sensitivity) than from more capable 
automation. Thus, the comparative human responsibility 
increases as the automation capabilities decrease, and vice 
versa. In addition, for automation with given capabilities, less 
capable humans will tend to rely more on the automation than 
would more capable humans. Thus, the comparative human 
responsibility increases, as the human capabilities increase.  
To demonstrate the combined effects of proposition 1, we 
computed the human responsibility as a function of d'Automation 
and d'Human, each on a scale ranging between .6 (low ability to 
distinguish between target and noise) and 3 (high ability to 
distinguish between target and noise) (see Fig. 4). The 
monotonic properties of Resp(Z) in d’Automation and d'Human, are 
evident. In this numerical example the target frequency is Pt = 
0.2, the payoff matrix ratio is Vratio = 2/3, and the optimal 
response criteria are βAutomation = βHuman = 2.7. We report below 
the results of sensitivity analyses of the effects of changes in the 
values of these parameters on responsibility outcomes. 
 
Proposition 2: Let R denote the detection sensitivities ratio: 
R= d'Automation/d'Human. Suppose that the human and the 
automation associate the same payoffs with correct and 
incorrect actions, then 𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) = 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→଴
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) = 1 
Proof: Proof is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 describes the combined effect of the 
automation and human detection sensitivities, when both 
associate the same payoffs with correct and incorrect actions. 
In this case, when the automation sensitivity is much higher 
than the human sensitivity (i.e. R is very large) the human 
responsibility for the output approaches zero, and the human 
relies mainly on the classifications made by the automated 
module. In contrast, when the automation sensitivity is much 
lower than human sensitivity (i.e. R is close to 0), the human 
responsibility for the output approaches 100%. Here humans 
rely mainly on their own classification capabilities, ignoring 
information from the automated module. It is important to note 
that even when the human sensitivity is not high, the human 
responsibility may still be high, as long as the automation 
sensitivity is much lower than that of the human (i.e. as long as 
R remains low). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Three (a) and two (b) dimensional presentation of responsibility values 
for different combinations of automation and human detection sensitivities (d').   
Fig. 5 presents an example of the numerical computation of 
human responsibility as a function of the ratio  
R= d'Automation/d'Human, based on the same assumptions of Fig. 4. 
Fig. 5(a) shows that the human responsibility may converge 
rapidly as a function of R. When R exceeds 3, the human 
responsibility is very close to zero, and for R lower than 1/3, the 
human is almost fully responsible for the system output. When 
the automation sensitivity is more than double that of the human 
sensitivity, the human responsibility drops below 20%. 
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Fig.5. Human responsibility as a function of the ratio between the automation 
and the human detection sensitivities plotted, (a) for different ratios of 
automation and human detection sensitivities, and (b) on the two-dimensional 
graph of Fig. 4(a) with dashed lines, representing different examples for fixed 
sensitivity ratios. 
Fig. 5(a) also demonstrates that when d'Human and d'Automation 
are similar, and their ratio R is close to 1, the responsibility 
measure can have a range of values. In this case, different 
combinations of d'Human and d'Automation, that have the same ratio 
R, can lead to different responsibility values. The reason for that 
is evident from Fig. 5(b) that shows that when R is close to 1, 
different combinations of d'Human and d'Automation can belong to 
different responsibility regions, depending on their specific 
values. In this case, human responsibility is higher when both 
d'Human and d'Automation are similarly low, compared to when both 
are similarly high. When both d'Human and d'Automation are equally 
high, the human can benefit from utilizing the additional 
information supplied by the automation. The decision will then 
be based on a similar weighting of the human's own information 
and the information from the automation, as both are rather 
accurate. The resultant human responsibility is approximately 
50% (40%-60%). However, when both sensitivities are low, the 
low detection sensitivity of the automation cannot add much to 
the human decision process. Hence, humans rely mainly on 
their own detection capability, even if it is limited, leading to 
higher human responsibility for the overall outcomes. 
A sensitivity analysis shows that changing the values of the 
variables that were assumed fixed in Fig. 4 and 5 does not 
change the above conclusions, as long as both the human and 
the automation associate the same payoffs with correct and 
incorrect actions and assume the same relative frequency of 
targets in the environment.   
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Human responsibility for different combinations of automation and 
human response criterion β. The Figure present the effects of differences in 
response criteria β, for three different ratios R (the ratio of automation and 
human sensitivities): (a) R=1/3; (b) R=3; (c) R=3/2. 
Matters are different when the human and the automation 
designers have considerably different preferences. These are 
reflected in considerably different estimates of the costs and 
benefits associated with different outcomes or through different 
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estimates of the target likelihood. This leads to the use of 
different response criteria by the automation and the human. 
Fig. 6 depicts the effects of differences in response criteria on 
human responsibility for three selected ratios of human and 
automation sensitivities. 
In the first case (Fig. 6a), R=1/3, due to the higher human 
sensitivity, humans rely mainly on their own classification 
capabilities and response criterion. This leads to very high 
human responsibility, regardless of the specific value of the 
automation's response criterion βAutomation. Thus, changes in 
βAutomation, have no effect on the overall human responsibility. 
In the second case (Fig. 6b), R=3, the human relies mainly on 
the automation classifications and has low responsibility. 
However, as is evident from the figure, the differences between 
the human and the automation response criteria affect the level 
of responsibility. When the human response criterion differs 
much from the automation response criterion (is more than 10 
times larger or smaller), the human responsibility is 
considerably higher (increases to 40%-50%) than when they are 
similar (less than 10%). The human and the automation 
response criteria differ when the two assign different values for 
possible decision outcomes, such as falsely engaging noise or 
missed engagement of targets. If this is the case, the human 
relies less on the automation classification, as it reflects a 
different assessment of the values of desired and undesired 
outcomes.  
In the third case (Fig. 6c) d'Automation is somewhat higher than 
d'Human, and neither value is high. In this case, the effect of 
differences between the human and the automation response 
criteria becomes more prominent. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Our results demonstrate that human responsibility in 
intelligent or automated systems depends on the combined 
characteristics of the human, the automation, and the 
operational environment. Therefore, even when important 
system functions are allocated to the human, human operators 
may still not be responsible for the system actions and their 
outcomes.  
Hence, simplistic demands to keep a human in the loop in 
order to retain meaningful human control can be misleading and 
futile. Literally adhering to them may create a mismatch 
between role responsibility, the extent to which system 
designers assign functions to human operators, and causal 
comparative responsibility, i.e., the actual level of human 
contribution to system processes and outcomes. Simply 
demanding human involvement does not assure that the human 
will have a meaningful role, since human responsibility 
depends on the design of the specific system and on the 
operational environment. 
We also show that, for some system configurations (when 
neglecting temporal aspects), both human-on-the-loop and 
human-in-the-loop levels of control can lead to the same level 
of human responsibility, because the same information flow 
model of the combined human-automation system represents 
both. Thus, the difference between these two systems is not 
always as substantial as commonly perceived.  
So, when and how should one involve a human in highly 
intelligent or automated systems? According to our analysis, 
humans only have significant comparative responsibility when 
they make unique contributions that supplement or exceed the 
automated module capabilities to perform certain functions 
(e.g., when the human has independent sources of information 
or is better able to select actions). However, as technologies 
develop, humans will contribute less to system processes. For 
instance, future AWS technologies will almost certainly 
outperform humans in many critical operational tasks, such as 
the ability to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants, to assess the likelihood of hitting a target or 
harming civilians, and to decide and act with very short reaction 
times. When humans will interact with such advanced systems, 
to which they will contribute very little, they may feel less 
motivated or conversely attempt to be more involved by 
interfering more than necessary. Both responses will probably 
impair the overall system performance. The ResQu model 
enables system designers to identify such cases in advance and 
to consider them when evaluating different design alternatives 
and when planning the human role in the system.  
With the advent of advanced intelligent systems and 
automation, with abilities that clearly exceed those of humans 
in many critical functions, a choice will have to be made. One 
can progress to fully autonomous systems that keep the human 
operator out of the loop and abandon the current prevailing 
demand for a system design with humans in the loop. 
Alternatively, one can limit the development of autonomous 
systems and the use of automation. The intermediate option, 
where systems will be increasingly intelligent while still 
keeping the human in the loop, can possibly lead to the 
inclusion of humans to simply fulfill regulatory requirements 
without them having any real impact on system performance.  
The current ethical and legal discussion regarding human 
involvement in intelligent systems and automation should not 
only focus on the advantages and disadvantages of such 
systems, but it should also consider the implications of keeping 
humans in the loop, even when they have little real influence. 
Falsely claiming that the human is responsible for adverse 
outcomes of actions of the system may expose her or him to 
unjustified legal liability and to the psychological burden of 
self-blaming, even when the person actually contributed very 
little to the outcomes. The ResQu responsibility measure can be 
mostly beneficial in these situations by exposing such 
anomalies and by providing a new method to quantify the actual 
human comparative responsibility for the outcomes. This can 
perhaps lead to a change in the legal treatment of human 
responsibility in intelligent systems and automation. 
It is important to note that the general ResQu model can be 
applied to represent interdependencies in complex human-
machine systems, with no specific prior assumptions regarding 
human rationality and behavior. However, when we applied this 
model to represent human interaction with AWS, using the 
principles of SDT, we assumed a best-case scenario of perfect 
rationality on the part of the human, perfect human knowledge 
of the automation’s properties and optimal human utilization of 
information. Under these assumptions, the computed human 
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responsibility will be optimal, given the properties of the 
system. Nevertheless, system designers can use the ResQu 
model to calculate the sensitivity of the optimal responsibility 
to those assumptions, for example by analyzing the impact of 
incomplete human knowledge, such as situations when humans 
underestimate the automation capabilities or overestimates their 
own capabilities.  
To conclude, the ResQu model, is a tool for quantifying 
responsibility that contributes to the understanding of human 
interaction with intelligent systems and advanced automation. 
This tool may aid system design and guide policy and legal 
decisions.  
Our study is clearly an initial step in the complex task of 
quantifying human responsibility in intelligent systems and 
highly automated systems. As a very first analytical 
formulation, the current version of the ResQu model assumes 
given human and automation capabilities, and it ignores any 
temporal aspects. As such, for instance, we do not consider the 
time required to make a decision and its implications on the 
human’s tendency to rely on the automation. We also do not 
deal, at this stage, with possible dynamic phenomena, where 
human or automation capabilities or payoffs may change over 
time. However, the framework we present here can easily be 
expanded to address temporal aspects. It can then evaluate not 
just transmitted information, but also information transmission 
rates, defining responsibility measures that also consider the 
human channel capacity constraints. 
Future work should also test the predictive ability of the 
ResQu model, by comparing the computed values to actual 
human performance, and by tying it to existing empirical 
research on human-automation interaction. A first empirical 
analysis of the ResQu model demonstrated that the model is not 
merely an abstract theoretical model, but it can also serve as a 
descriptive model, that allows us to predict the actual 
responsibility users take on when using a system [63]. 
V. APPENDIX 
This appendix presents the basic Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) concepts and formulas we used to model the 
probabilistic nature of the AWS and to perform the numerical 
calculations, leading to the results presented in the manuscript. 
The most basic model of SDT describes a system with a 
single sensor, observing an environment with only two possible 
entities: Target+Noise (referred to as Target) and Noise alone 
(referred to as Noise) that occur with probability Pt and 1- Pt, 
respectively. Both entities can be measured by a single 
observable parameter, which transforms the data into a scale 
value. The distributions of values of the observed 
characteristics for target and noise entities differ (with targets 
usually assumed to have a larger mean value that noise), which 
allows some discrimination between the two types of entities. 
However, the distributions overlap, so when a certain value is 
observed, there is uncertainty whether the entity is indeed a 
target, or whether it is actually noise. 
The sensor is required to identify and engage targets and to 
prevent engagement of noise. This binary decision is 
categorized as Engage or Abort. The responses are the 
outcomes of the decision process and can be categorized as True 
Positive (TP) when a target is present and the response is to 
engage, False Negative (FN) when a target is present and the 
response is not to engage, True Negative (TN) when no target 
is present and the response is not to engage, and False Positive 
(FP) when no target is present and the response is to engage. 
 
TABLE A.1   
CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN RESPONSES USING SDT 
 
   Human Response 
  Engage Abort 
Actual  
Environment state 
Target True Positive (TP) 
False 
Negative (FN) 
Noise False Positive (FP) 
True 
Negative (TN) 
 
In general, signal detection theory enables the differentiation 
between the detection sensitivity of a sensor and its response 
bias. The detection sensitivity (d') is the sensor's ability to 
differentiate between target and noise. This is represented by 
the shift of the signal probability density function, compared to 
the noise probability density function. When d'=0, the sensor is 
unable to distinguish between target and noise. As d' increases, 
the ability to distinguish between the two entities increases.  
For every value of the observed parameter, one can compute 
the likelihoods of observing that value under the target 
distribution or the noise distributions. We assume a threshold 
likelihood ratio, so that an observation with a lower likelihood 
ratio will be considered as noise, and an observation with a 
higher likelihood ratio will be considered as signal. This 
threshold is called the response criterion (β). The response 
criterion represents the sensor's tendency to favor one response 
over the other. The value of the observed parameter at the 
threshold is the cutoff point (C). Thus, when the observed value 
is below the cutoff point, the observation is classified as noise, 
and when the observed value is above the cutoff point, the 
observation is classified as a target. The values of d' and β 
determine the probabilities of the four possible outcomes (TP, 
FN, FP, and TN) as presented in Fig. A.1. 
 
 
Fig. A.1. The basic SDT model, with probability density functions for target 
and noise, detection sensitivity (d'), response criterion (β), cutoff point (C) and 
probabilities of possible outcomes. 
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The distribution of noise and target over the values of the 
observable variable is denoted by 𝐸௡ , 𝐸௧. In the basic normal, 
equal variance SDT model we have: 
𝐸௡~𝑁(𝜇௡, 𝜎௡ଶ)        𝐸௧~𝑁(𝜇௧ , 𝜎௧ଶ)            (A1) 
 
µ௡ = −.5𝑑ᇱ    µ௧ = .5𝑑ᇱ    𝜎௡ଶ = 𝜎௧ଶ = 1          (A2) 
 In this case:  
𝐸௡~𝑁(−.5𝑑′, 1)        𝐸௧~𝑁(.5𝑑′, 1)                (A3) 
𝑑ᇱ = 𝜇௧ − 𝜇௡                       (A4) 
𝛽 = ௙೟(௖)
௙೙(௖)
                               (A5) 
𝑙𝑛𝛽 = 𝑙𝑛 ௙೟(௖)
௙೙(௖)
= 𝑙𝑛 𝑓௧(𝑐) − 𝑙𝑛 𝑓௡(𝑐) = 𝑑′𝑐     (A6) 
          𝑐 = ௟௡ఉ
ௗᇲ
                           (A7) 
 
The probability for different outcomes can be calculated as:  
 
   P(𝑇𝑃) = 𝑃(𝐸௧ > 𝑐)      𝑃(𝐹𝑁) = 𝑃(𝐸௧ ≤ 𝑐)         (A8) 
       𝑃(𝐹𝑃) = 𝑃(𝐸௡ > 𝑐)      𝑃(𝑇𝑁) = 𝑃(𝐸௡ ≤ 𝑐)   
 
Now, assume that there are cost-benefit values associated 
with each outcome: VFP VTN VFN VTP (where: VFP and VFN are 
negative costs, VTP and VTN are positive benefits). Then, it can 
be shown that the optimal response criterion, β*, which 
maximizes the expected value is given by:  
 
𝛽∗ =  ଵି௉೟
௉೟
௏೅ಿି௏ಷು
௏೅ುି௏ಷಿ
                       (A9) 
Where Pt is the target probability and 1- Pt is the noise 
probability. We denote the ratio of the cost-benefit values as: 
 
𝑉௥௔௧௜௢ =
௏೅ಿି௏ಷಿ
௏೅ುି௏ಷಿ 
                       (A10) 
 
To conclude, under the above assumptions, if we know the 
probability of signal in the environment (Ps), the sensor's 
sensitivity (d'), and the ratio of the cost-benefit values (Vratio), 
we can use the above formulas to calculate an optimal response 
criterion (β*) that maximizes the expected value. We can also 
compute the True Positive and False Positive rates. 
The human and the automated module may have different 
detection sensitivities (d’Human and d’Automation), leading to 
different capabilities to classify whether a given entity is a 
legitimate target or noise. In addition, the human and the 
automation may also differ in the threshold value above which 
they classify an entity as a target (with response criteria βHuman 
and βAutomation, respectively). 
We next examine the case where the human detection is 
aided by the automated module, which produces an alert when 
it identifies a suspected target. Assume that the automated 
module has detection sensitivity d’Automation and a response 
criterion βAutomation, which are known to the human. Denote the 
module's rates of True Positives by 𝑃෨்௉ and False Positives by  
𝑃෨ி௉. Using Bayes’ law, the human can use these probabilities to 
update the prior probability of signal in the environment, 
according the automation classification results.  
Denote by 𝑃෠௧/"்", the human posterior probability for target, 
when the automated module classifies an entity as target.  
 
𝑃෠௧/"்" =
௉೟௉෨೅ು
௉೟௉෨೅ುା(ଵି௉೟)௉෨ಷು
                         (A11) 
 
The human uses 𝑃෠௧/"்" , instead of Pt in (A9), to compute the 
optimal response criterion that maximizes the expected value, 
given that the module has classified an entity as a target.  
Denote by 𝑃෠௧/"ே", the human posterior probability for target, 
when the automated module classifies an entity as noise. 
 
𝑃෠௧/"ே" =
௉೟௉෨ಷಿ
௉೟௉෨ಷಿା(ଵି௉೟)௉෨೅ಿ
= ௉೟(ଵି௉
෨೅ು)
௉೟(ଵି௉෨೅ು)ା(ଵି௉೟)(ଵି௉෨ಷು)
     (A12) 
 
In the same manner, the human uses 𝑃෠௧/"ே" (A9) to compute 
the optimal response criterion that maximizes the expected 
value, given that the module has classified an entity as a noise.  
Thus, when aided by an automated module, the human uses 
two different response criteria or cutoff points: one is used 
when the automated module classifies an entity as target and the 
other when the automated module classifies an entity as noise. 
The human cutoff point when the entity was classified as target 
by the automation is smaller than when it was classified as noise 
(see Fig. A.2). 
 
 
Fig. A.2. SDT model when human detection is aided by an automated module. 
There are two cutoff points according to the module's classification results.  
By adjusting the threshold according to the classification of 
the automated module, the human increases the probability of 
distinguishing between target and noise.  
  13                                                                                       
 
Denote by d’effective the combined sensitivity of such a system. 
This is essentially the sensitivity equivalent to a single Gaussian 
SDT detector that has the same level of performance as the 
combined tandem human-automation system. By definition, 
d’effective is greater than d’Human and d’Automation.  
Assume that (a) the distributions of the observed values of 
target and noise are normal with unit variance; (b) the cost and 
benefit values VFP VTN VFN VTP are the same for the human and 
the automated module; (c) the cost and benefit values for the 
human are independent of the classification results of the 
automatic module; (d) the initial information the human and the 
module have about a the state of the world are uncorrelated.  
Pollack and Madans [62] have shown that under the above 
simplifying assumptions the maximum value of d’effective, when 
the detectors preserve continuous information and an optimal 
decision rule is employed, will be equal to  
𝑑′௠௔௫ = ට𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡
ଶ +  𝑑ᇱ஺௨௧௢௠௔௧௜௢௡
ଶ          (A13) 
 
In our system, there is some loss of information, since the 
automation provides only binary information rather than 
continuous, so in most cases d’effective will be lower than d’max. 
𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘ ≤ ට𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡
ଶ +  𝑑ᇱ஺௨௧௢௠௔௧௜௢௡
ଶ           (A14) 
𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡ ≤ 𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘                𝑑ᇱ஺௨௧௢௠௔௧௜௢௡ ≤ 𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘  
Lemma 1: Resp(Z) is monotonically increasing in d'Human. 
Proof: Assume that d'Human increases, and all other variables 
remain fixed. In particular, since d’Automation remains fixed, so do 
the human posterior probabilities for target  𝑃෠௧/"்" and 𝑃෠௧/"ே", 
presented in equations (A11) and (A12). Denote by β*"T" and 
β*"N" , respectively, the optimal human response criterions that 
maximizes the expected value, given that the module has 
classified an entity as a target or noise.  
 
𝛽"்"∗ =  
ଵି ௉෠೟/"೅"
 ௉෠೟/"೅"
௏೅ಿି௏ಷು
௏೅ುି௏ಷಿ
        𝛽"ே"∗ =  
ଵି௉෠೟/"ಿ"
௉෠೟/"ಿ"
௏೅ಿି௏ಷು
௏೅ುି௏ಷಿ
    (A15) 
 
These two criteria remain fixed as d'Human increases. For each 
of them, there is a corresponding cutoff point that can be 
derived using equation (A7). As d'Human increases, it follows 
from (A7) that the weight the human gives to the automation 
decreases monotonically to zero, so the two corresponding 
cutoff points are moving towards each other, approaching 0. 
This means that as d'Human increases, when selecting an action, 
the human assigns more weight to d'Human and less weight to the 
automation classification results. 
In terms of information theory, this means that as d'Human 
increases, the human action selection variable X depends less 
on the automation classification variable, Y. Hence their mutual 
information I(X:Y) decreases monotonically, H(X/Y) increases 
monotonically, and so does H(X/Y)/H(X). From equations (6) 
we can conclude that Resp(Z) is monotonically increasing in 
d'Human □ 
 
Lemma 2: Resp(Z) is monotonically decreasing in d’Automation 
Proof: Assume that d’Automation increases, and all other 
variables remain fixed. As d’Automation increases, both 𝑃෨்௉ →1 
and 𝑃෨்ே →1 monotonically. 
We first examine the case when the automated module 
classifies an entity as a target. Here, the human uses 𝑃෠௧/"்" to 
compute the optimal response criterion, instead of Pt in (A9). 
From (A11) we get 𝑃෠௧/"்"→1. The increase in 𝑃෠௧/"்" lowers the 
human response criterion, and from (A7) this lowers the 
corresponding human cutoff point, so 𝑃்௉/"்"→1. Denote by 
𝑃ா௡௚௔௚௘/"்" the probability that the human will choose to 
engage an entity, given that it was classified as a target by the 
automation. 
 𝑃ா௡௚௔௚௘/"்" = 𝑃෠௧/"்"𝑃்௉/"்" + ൫1 − 𝑃෠௧/"்"൯𝑃ி௉/"்"      (A16) 
From the above, when d’Automation increases, 𝑃ா௡௚௔௚௘/"்" 
monotonically increases to 1. In a similar manner, it can be 
shown that when d’Automation increases and an entity is classified 
as noise by the automation, 𝑃ா௡௚௔௚௘/"ே" decreases 
monotonically to 0.  
Therefore, as d’Automation increases, there is a higher 
probability that the human will act according to the automation 
classification, engaging an entity that the automated module 
classified as target and not engaging an entity it classified as 
noise. 
In terms of information theory, this means that as d’Automation 
increases, the automation classification variable, Y, provides 
more information to the human action selection variable X, 
monotonically reducing H(X/Y), the remaining uncertainty 
about X when Y is known, towards zero. Denote by T a 
Bernoulli variable that corresponds to the prevalence of targets 
in the environment. As d’Automation increases, the distribution of 
Y approaches the distribution of T so H(Y) approaches a fixed 
known value H(T) ∈ (0,1). In addition, as d’Automation increases, 
the distribution of X approaches the distribution Y, so H(X) also 
approaches H(T). From equations (6) we get 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) = ு(௑ ௒⁄ )
ு(௑)
  → ଴
ு(்)
= 0              (A17) 
 
Thus, we can conclude that Resp(Z) monotonically decreases 
in d’Automation □ 
 
Proposition 1: The comparative human responsibility 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) is monotonically decreasing in d’Automatio, and 
monotonically increasing in d'Human. 
Proof: Proof is immediate from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. □ 
 
Proposition 2: Let R denote the detection sensitivities ratio: 
R = d’Automation / d'Human. Suppose that the human and the 
automation associate the same payoffs with correct and 
incorrect actions, then 𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) = 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→଴
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) = 1 
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Proof: Under condition of the proposition and our model 
assumptions, equation (A14) holds. Using 
 R= d’Automation / d’Human :  
 
𝑑ᇱ஺௨௧௢௠௔௧௜௢௡ ≤ 𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘ ≤ ට
ௗᇲಲೠ೟೚೘ೌ೟೔೚೙
మ
ோమ
+ 𝑑ᇱ஺௨௧௢௠௔௧௜௢௡
ଶ    (A18) 
 
Consequently 𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘ = 𝑑ᇱ஺௨௧௢௠௔௧௜௢௡. This means 
that when both human and automation associate the same 
payoffs with correct and incorrect actions, and d’Automation is 
much larger than d’Human, a rational human will base the action 
selection decision primarily upon the results of the automation 
classification. Therefore, when R ∞ the human action 
selection variable, X, will be fully determined by the automation 
classification variable, Y, and thus will have the same 
distribution as Y. In terms of entropy this means  
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
𝐻(𝑋/𝑌) = 0            𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
𝐻(𝑋) = 𝐻(𝑌)       (A19) 
From equations (6) we have 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) =  𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→ஶ
ு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
 = ଴
ு(௒)
= 0               (A20) 
 
The proof for R  0 is analogical. In this case, we have:  
𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡ ≤ 𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘ ≤ ට𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡
ଶ +  𝑅ଶ𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡
ଶ   (A21) 
Thus, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→଴
𝑑′௘௙௙௘௖௧௜௩௘ = 𝑑ᇱு௨௠௔௡. This means that when 
d’Human is much larger than d’Automation, and both human and 
automation associate the same payoffs with correct and 
incorrect actions, rational humans will base the action selection 
decision primarily on their own detection capabilities. 
Therefore, when R 0 the human action selection variable, X, 
will be independent from the automation classification variable, 
Y. In terms of entropy this means:  
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→଴
𝐻(𝑋/𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑋)                    (A22) 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→଴
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑍) =  𝑙𝑖𝑚
ோ→଴
ு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
 = ு(௑)
ு(௑)
= 1      (A23) 
This completes the proof. □ 
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